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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
COpy 
SCOTT TOBERMAN, 
Plaintiff 
v. 
LAROSE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, et al. 
Defendants 
LAROSE LIMITED PARNTERSHIP, et al. 
Counterclaim Plaintiffs 
v. 
SCOTT TOBERMAN, et al. 
Counterclaim Defendants 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
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Civil Action File No. 2007-CV- 131894 
(Business Division Two-EL) 
FIL ED IN OFFICE 
MAY 242007 
OEPlITY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON coum GA 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The above-styled case is before the Court on Counterclaim Defendants' Motion for Judgment 
() on the Pleadings as to Count XV of the First Amended Counterclaim, Counterclaim Plaintiffs' Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment on Count XV of the First Amended Counterclaim, and Defendants' 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Counts I-III, V-XVII, XIX and XX of the Amended and 
Restated Complaint. The Court has considered the oral argument of the parties, the briefs filed on 
behalf of the Motions, and the file in this case, and finds as follows: 
I. FACTS 
Austerlitz Partners, LLC; Batard Partners, LLC; Charlemagne Partners, LLC; Chevalier 
Partners, LLC; EAR 250 Wacker, Inc.; EAR Clainnont, Inc.; EAR Crescent, Inc.; EAR Crescent 
Centre, LLC; EAR Gage, Inc.; EAR Georgia, INC.; EAR Hartsfield, Inc.; EAR Larose, Inc.; EAR 
Lasalle, Inc.; EAR LeoviIIe, Inc.; EAR Northside, Inc.; EAR Summer, LLC; EAR Trafalgar, LLC; 
Esplendido Partners, LLC; European American Realty, Ltd.; Gloucester Construction Management 
o Co.; Lafayette Real Estate Services, Inc.; Les Fort Partners, LLC; Montrachet Partners, LLC; 
Southeast Funding Associates, LLC; Southeast Realty Partners, LLC; Southeast Funding Title, LLC; 
and Trafalgar Partners LLC (collectively, the "Toberman Entities") are, together with Scott 
(J Toberman (the "Plaintiff") and Beth Toberman, the Counterclaim Defendants (collectively, 
"Toberman"). Harold Gootrad, Jerome Engerman and Gerald Frishman (the "Individual GEF 
Defendants") along with Chamberlain Limited Partnership; Chambertin Limited Partnership; Cheval 
Limited Partnership; Corton Limited Partnership; Ducru Limited Partnership; Ducru SPE, LLC; 
Echezeaux Limited Partnership; Lafite Limited Partnership; Larose Limited Partnership; Leoville 
Limited Partnership; Longstreet Partners, LLC; Margaux Partners, LLC; Mouton Limited Partnership; 
OMIC Partners, LLC; st. Vivant Limited Partnership; and 250 Wacker Limited Partnership are the 
Defendants/Counterclaim Plaintiffs (collectively, the "GEF Partnerships"). 
The GEF Partnerships are a collection of various business entities with real estate projects and 
holdings in several major United States cities. Scott Toberman, a long time business partner of Harold 
Gootrad, created the Toberman Entities to serve as the property and asset managers for various GEF 
o Partnerships. 
On April 25, 2005, the Individual GEF Defendants confronted Scott Toberman with 
accusations of mismanagement and misappropriation of business funds in excess of $10 million. On 
that same day, and as a result of the confrontation, Scott Tobennan and the GEF Partnerships entered 
into an agreement (the "Letter Agreement") outlining the framework of a future settlement. 
After further negotiations, the parties entered into a Binding Tenn Sheet Agreement (the 
"BTS") signed by Scott Toberman, Beth Toberman, and by the Individual GEF Defendants on behalf 
of the GEF Partnerships on July 14, 2005. In exchange for a release of Scott Toberman, the BTS 
established a $7.5 million settlement amount (the "Settlement Amount"), the payment terms, and 
mechanisms for Scott Tobennan and the Toberman Entities to tum over certain assets to the GEF 
Partnerships in return for credits against the Settlement Amount. Such assets included a Fulton County 
() residence (the "Home"), a Raburn County farm (the "Farm"), a wine collection (the "Wine"), certain 
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condominium conversion proceeds, and partnerships interests (the "Partnership Interests"). Under 
o the BTS, Scott Tobennan was to make an initial cash payment of $375,000 at the time of signing the 
BTS, a subsequent cash payment due sixty (60) days after sib'l1ing the BTS, and a final payment within 
six (6) months after signing a global settlement agreement (a "GSA"). In accordance with the BTS, 
Scott Tobennan provided the GEF Partnerships with $375,000 upon executing the BTS, warranty 
deeds to the Home and the Fann, and later turned over the Wine and signed a series of related 
documents such as releases and consents. 
Some time after the execution of the BTS, Scott Tobennan, Beth Tobennan and the GEF 
Partnerships entered into an agreement regarding the Home (the "Home Agreement") giving Scott 
and Beth Tobennan thirty (30) days to exercise an option for a return of the warranty deed. After 
further negotiations, the GEF Partnerships tendered a final draft of a GSA for Scott Tobennan's 
signature, which was never signed. Negotiations ceased and the GEF Partnerships, relying upon the 
o BTS and the Home Agreement, recorded the deeds to the Home and the Fann, sold the Wine, and 
assumed the Partnership Interests. Shortly thereafter, Scott Tobennan filed suit in Cobb Superior 
Court to regain possession of the Wine and to quiet title to the Home and Fann, which later was 
expanded through amendments and counterclaims. This case has been transferred to Fulton Superior 
Court where five (5) related cases are pending. 
II. COUNT XV: BINDING TERM SHEETIBREACH OF CONTRACT 
Tobennan's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count XV of the First Amended 
Counterclaim as well as the GEF Partnerships' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the same 
Count address the enforceability of the BTS. 
Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is "no genuine issue of material fact". 
O.C.G.A. § 9-ll-56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the Court must construe the 
o evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Collins v. Newman Machine Co., Inc., 
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190 Ga. App. 879, 882 (1989). "The party moving for summary judgment has the burden of showing 
o the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and if the trial court is presented with a choice of 
inferences to be drawn from the facts, all inferences of fact from the proofs proffered at the hearing 
must be drawn against the movant and in favor of the party opposing the motion." Stephens v. 
Gwinnett County, 175 Ga. App. 379, 382 (1985). 
In their briefs, Toberman asserts that the BTS is an agreement to agree which is unenforceable 
under Georgia law because it does not contain all the essential terms of an agreement. Tobennan also 
points to the fact that paragraph 4(a) of the BTS specifically contemplates future negotiations between 
the parties and the execution of a GSA. Tobennan contends that key elements such as choice of law 
and acceleration of payment are not contained in the BTS. Additionally, Toberman argues that the 
transfer of the Partnership Interests contemplated in paragraph 4(e) and the $7.5 million Settlement 
Amount established in paragraph 4(d) are contingent upon entering into a GSA; thus they are 
o unenforceable obligations in the absence of a GSA. 
() 
The GEF Partnerships, on the other hand, contend that the entire BTS is a binding and 
enforceable agreement with all material terms sufficiently defined. To support their argument, the 
GEF Partnerships rely upon paragraph 6 ofthe BTS which states that the BTS is "binding." The GEF 
Partnerships also point to email communications from Scott Toberman's counsel during negotiations 
of the BTS requesting that the BTS be "binding" on all parties, agreeing to the Settlement Amount, and 
agreeing to transfer the Partnership Interests in exchange for a $1 million credit. Finally, the GEF 
Partnerships also argue that Toberman's substantial part performance of the BTS (transfer of deeds to 
the Home and Fann, transfer of the Wine, cash payment, and transfer of the condominium conversion 
proceeds) supports a finding that the BTS is enforceable. 
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A. Enforceability of the BTS 
1. Agreement to Agree 
Under Georgia law, agreements to agree are unenforceable. "Unless an agreement is reached 
as to all tenns and conditions and nothing is left to future negotiations, a contract to enter into a 
contract in the future is of no effect." Coldmatic Refrigeration of Canada, Ltd. v. Hess, 257 Ga. App. 
753,754 (2002); see also, Se. Underwriters, Inc. v. AFLAC, Inc., 210 Ga. App. 444, 446 (1993). In 
order to detennine whether or not an agreement is sufficiently definite as to all material tenns, the 
courts look to whether or not the writing "will enable the courts, under proper rules of construction, to 
ascertain the tenns and conditions on which the parties intended to bind themselves." Davidson 
Mineral Prop., Inc., v. Baird, 260 Ga. 75, 78 (1990). Mere contemplation of more formal 
documentation of already agreed to terms does not invalidate or hold unenforceable an earlier, 
infonnal agreement. Pourreza v. Teel Appraisals & Advisory, Inc., 273 Ga. App. 880 (2005); see also, 
() T.C. V'Soske v. E.T. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495 (\968). 
The Court of Appeals in Pourreza v. Teel Appraisals & Advisory, Inc., 273 Ga. App. 880, 
upheld a letter as an enforceable settlement agreement. In Pourreza, the defendant memorialized the 
basic terms of a settlement agreement where one party agreed to drop complaints in exchange for 
waiving attorneys' fees. The letter offered to put the terms into a more formal document if the parties 
desired. Id. at 881. Pourreza did not object to the settlement terms but requested further 
documentation, and while the formal settlement agreement was being finalized, Pourreza withdrew the 
settlement. Id. at 88\-82. The Court of Appeals found the original letter to be a "mutual, binding 
agreement" despite the fact that it contained little more than the scope of the settlement. Id. at 883. 
The Court of Appeals concluded that this was "simply a case where an agreement as to terms was 
clearly made and then someone changed her mind and no longer wanted to settle the case." Id., 
o citations omitted; see also, Goobich v. Waters, 283 Ga. App. 53 (2006) (holding a letter of intent for a 
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real estate sale enforceable because it defined the purchase price, property to be sold, and the closing 
o date in addition to an expressed intent to be bound). 
Conversely, the Court of Appeals has refused to enforce an agreement where material terms to 
the contract were left unresolved. In Coldmatic Refrigeration, the Court of Appeals refused to enforce 
an agreement where the language read that it was a "basis of understanding" to be used as "guide" and 
for "direction" by the parties and left issues such as noncompete provision, governing corporate law, 
and shareholder approval rights uncertain. 257 Ga. App. 753, 755; see also, Miami Heights LT, LLC 
v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 283 Ga. App. 779 (2007) (holding a letter of intent unenforceable because 
the unresolved restrictive covenant was an essential term in a real estate lease/sale). 
Toberman argues that because the BTS specifically contemplated further negotiations which 
were to be culminated in a GSA and because certain terms such as a choice of law provision were not 
provided for, the BTS is an unenforceable agreement to agree. Tobennan submitted supplemental 
() authority to support the position that choice of law is a material provision and that the failure to 
address this tenn is grounds for holding the BTS unenforceable. 
The BTS entered into by the GEF Partnerships and Scott Toberman contained a "binding" 
provision clearly stating the parties' intent to be bound by the BTS. Cf., Overton Apparel Inc., v. 
Russell Corp., 264 Ga. App. 306, 307 (2003) (holding a letter of intent unenforceable, in part, because 
it contained the phrase "nonbinding"); Coldmatic Refrigeration of Canada, Ltd. v. Hess, 257 Ga. App. 
at 755. The BTS defined material terms such as payment and release obligations, scope of the 
agreement, and perfonnance timeframes. Even the issue of final payment was sufficiently definite 
because it was due within six (6) months after entering into a GSA, which was to be entered within 
fourteen (14) days after the BTS. While Toberman contends that choice oflaw is a material provision 
that should render the agreement unenforceable, the settlement agreement upheld in Pourezza did not 
(J contain a choice of law provision. Additionally, the cases cited by Toberman's counsel are not 
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factually similar and there is no indication in the record that a choice of law provision was discussed 
o by the parties prior to signing the BTS. 
2. Part Performance 
While this Court finds that the BTS is an enforceable agreement, Tobennan's perfonnance of 
several obligations under the BTS provides further grounds to hold the BTS enforceable. Roberson v. 
Eichholz, 217 Ga. App. 511, 513 (1995); Pine Valley Apartments Ltd. P'ship v. First State Bank, 143 
Ga. App. 242, 245 (1977) ("A contract which is originally and inherently too indefinite may later 
acquire precision and become enforceable by virtue of the subsequent acts ... Thus the objection of 
indefiniteness may be obviated by perfonnance ... "). Specifically, Toberman paid $375,000 in cash, 
transferred the deeds to the Home and Farm, transferred ownership of the Wine, and assigned the 
condominium conversion proceeds to the GEF Partnerships. 
This Court finds the BTS to be a binding contract and GRANTS the GEF Partnerships' Motion 
() for Partial Summary Judgment on Count XV ofthe First Amended Counterclaim. 
B. Breach ofthe BTS 
Count XV of the Counterclaim alleges that Toberman breached the BTS by failing to pay the 
balance due, by refusing to execute a GSA, by failing to assign the Partnership Interests, by selling 
assets in violation of the asset pledge, by continuing misappropriations, by removing assets and by 
dispossessing the Wine. 
1. Settlement Amount 
Rules of contract interpretation, provided in O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2, require, among other things, 
for the court to read the contract "in whole" and that the entire contract should be "looked to in 
arriving at the construction of any part." Additionally, the "cardinal rule" of contract construction is to 
ascertain the intent of the parties. O.C.G.A. § 13-2-3. 
(J Paragraph 4(d) of the BTS states that the "Toberman Entities will pay $7.5 million ... to the 
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GEF Partnerships." Tobennan contends that executing a GSA is a condition precedent to the 
o Settlement Amount being binding. The Settlement Amount, however, is the backbone of the BTS and 
the starting point for all other obligations under paragraph 4 which details the settlement between the 
parties. The BTS, read as a whole, is an agreement for Tobennan to pay $7.5 miIlion (through a series 
of different transfers and payments) to the GEF Partnerships in exchange for a release of Scott 
Tobennan by the GEF Partnerships. The record is clear that Tobennan has not paid the $7.5 miIlion 
due under the BTS, thus the BTS has been breached. 
2. Partnership Interests 
Under paragraph 4(e) of the BTS, Tobennan was obligated to transfer Partnership Interests to 
the GEF Partnerships. The paragraph states, "Upon entering into the Global Settlement Agreement, 
the Tobennan Entities will transfer to the GEF Partnerships the interests they possess in the entities 
listed on Exhibit A attached hereto and release all claims for amounts due or alleged to due .... " As 
CJ with the Settlement Amount, execution of the GSA was not a condition precedent to Tobennan's 
obligation to transfer the Partnership Interests. 
o 
Limited partnership interests are personal property and must be affinnatively transferred from 
an old to a new owner. O.C.G.A. § 14-9-701. The BTS provided that the transfer would take place 
upon execution of a GSA. The BTS did not provide language for an assignment of the Partnership 
Interests in the absence of a GSA as it did in paragraphs 4 G) and (k) for the condominium conversion 
proceeds, which stated "[u]nless and until the Global Settlement Agreement is executed, this Tenn 
Sheet shall serve as such assignment ... " Because the parties never entered into a GSA, there was no 
effective transfer of the Partnership Interests from Tobennan to the GEF Partnerships, even though 
they were obligated to do so. Accordingly, the failure to transfer the Partnership Interests, as required 
under the BTS, is a breach for which the GEF Partnerships are entitled to damages. 
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3. Remaining Breach Claims 
Paragraph 6 of the BTS, in addition to providing that the BTS was a binding obligation of the 
parties, stated: 
... The Tobem1an Entities and the GEF Partnerships agree to negotiate in good faith the 
terms of the Global Settlement Agreement (and related Release Agreement, 
Confidentiality Agreement and Global Escrow) and will use their best efforts to cause 
the Global Settlement Agreement and related documents) to be entered into within 14 
days of the date hereof .... 
The GEF Partnerships contend that Scott Tobennan's refusal to sign a GSA constituted a breach ofthe 
obligation to negotiate in good faith the terms of a GSA since he has not provided "good" reasons for 
his refusal. The BTS only obligated the parties to negotiate in good faith; it did not obligate them to 
execute a GSA. The GEF partnerships have not satisfied their burden of showing that the failure to 
execute a GSA was a breach of the BTS. 
During oral argument, counsel for the GEF Partnerships stated that the Wine was sold and that 
C) an accounting had been made and distributed to Toberman. Similarly, the deeds for the Home and the 
Fann have been recorded by the GEF Partnerships. Therefore, claims of breach relating to these issues 
are moot. The remaining claims of breach of Count XV are outside of the scope of issues briefed and 
argued. 
C. Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings 
Toberman moved this Court for judgn1ent on the pleadings on Count XV of the First Amended 
Counterclaim. Judgn1ent on the pleadings is appropriate where the pleadings affinnatively show that 
no claim exists where the party would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts. See, 
Frady v. Irvin, 245 Ga. 307 (1980). Accordingly, this Court DENIES Toberman's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count XV of the First Amended Counterclaim. 
III. SCOTT TOBERMAN'S COMPLAINT 
The GEF Partnerships moved for summary judgn1ent on Counts I-III, V-XII, XIX and XX of 
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Scott Tobennan's Amended and Restated Complaint.' 
o Summary judgment is appropriate only where there is "no genuine issue of material fact". 
O.C.O.A. § 9-11-56(c). As stated above, the Court construes evidence in the light most favorable to 
the non-moving party. Collins v. Newman Machine Co .. Inc .. 190 Ga. App. 879, 882 (1989); see also, 
Stephens v. Gwinnett County, 175 Ga. App. 379, 382 (1985). "Under OCGA § 9-11-56, once a 
movant supports his motion for summary judgment, the opponent cannot rest upon the mere 
allegations of his complaint, but must come forth with affidavits or other evidence setting forth specific 
facts showing that a genuine issue exists for trial." Parker v. Silviano, No. A06A1829, 2007 WL 
805821, *3 (Ga. App. March 19,2007). 
1. Fraudulent Inducement: Counts I & XI 
Scott Tobennan alleges that he was fraudulently induced to enter into the Letter Agreement, the 
BTS, and the Home Agreement (collectively, the "Agreements") because of statements made by the 
(J Individual GEF Defendants relating to the confidentiality of the Agreements, the ability of Scott 
Tobennan and/or the Tobennan Entities to be reimbursed for ongoing operational costs, and the scope 
o 
of documents to be transferred to the GEF Partnerships under the tenns of the Agreements. Scott 
Tobennan alleges fraudulent inducement to enter into the Agreements in Count I and civil conspiracy 
to fraudulently induce him to enter into the Agreements in Count XI of Scott Tobennan's Amended 
and Restated Complaint. 
Fraudulent inducement requires five elements to be established: (1) a false represent~tion of 
fact, (2) known by the speaker to be false at the time stated, (3) spoken with the intent to deceive the 
listener (i.e., scienter), (4) justifiable reliance by the listener upon the false statements, and (5) damages 
proximately caused by the representations. Todd v. Martinez Paint & Body, Inc., 238 Ga. App. 128, 
1. The GEF Partnerships did not move for summary judgment on Count IV (Tortious & Malicious Interference with 
Business and Contractual Relations). The Complaint was incorrectly numbered; there is no count XVIII. Additionally, 
because the parties briefed and presented oral argument on Counts XIII-XVIII, they are addressed in this Order. 
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128 (1999). To successfully move for summary judgment, a party must show that the evidence in the 
o record is insufficient to create a jury issue on at least one essential element of the other party's case. 
JarAllah v. Schoen, 243 Ga. App. 402, 403 (2000); see also, OCGA § 9-11-56(e). Thereafter, "the 
plaintiff must come forward with some evidence from which a jury could find each of the ... 
elements .... " JarAllah, 243 Ga. App. at 403-404. 
The GEF Partnerships point to Scott Toberman's deposition testimony indicating that, prior to 
entering into the BTS, he knew of the GEF Partnerships' intention to disclose the tenns of the 
Agreements to certain parties. He also knew before signing the BTS that he would not be reimbursed 
for certain costs. Additionally, Scott Toberman was unable to identify any document taken by the GEF 
Partnerships in breach of the parties' Agreements. Thus, Scott Toberman failed to identify "specific 
evidence giving rise to a triable issue." Id. at 403. Relying upon Scott Toberman's deposition 
testimony, the GEF Partnerships have sufficiently established that there is no triable issue of fact 
(J involved in the claim of fraudulent inducement, thus summary judgment is justified. 
() 
Summary judgment on a civil conspiracy claim is appropriate if there is no underlying tort. 
Benefit Support, Inc. v. Hall County, 281 Ga. App. 825, 832 (2007) (holding that there can be no 
liability for civil conspiracy if there is no underlying tort). Since the alleged tort is fraudulent 
inducement, this Court GRANTS the GEF Partnerships' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I 
(Fraudulent Inducement) and Count XI (Civil Conspiracy). 
2. Enforceability of Agreements: Count II 
Scott Tobennan seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 9-4-1 that the 
Agreements are not enforceable, that Toberman is under no obligation to perform, that Toberman is 
entitled to a return of all property, and that the GEF Partnerships' attempts to collect assets amounted 
to pre-judgment garnishments in violation of Georgia law. 
Scott Toberman presented no evidence or arguments supporting the unenforceability of the 
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Letter Agreement. The enforceability of the BTS has been previously addressed in this Order and held 
o to be an enforceable agreement. During oral argument, Scott Toberman's counsel withdrew the 
argument as it related to the Home Agreement. 
Scott Tobennan alleges that the GEF Partnerships' actions of taking possession of property, 
filing the deeds to the Home and Fann, etc. amounted to prejudgment garnishment outside of the 
circumstances pennitted under O.C.G.A. § 18-4-40. Garnishment is a judicial proceeding whereby a 
third party or obligor is ordered to tum over property to the obligee. Black's Law Dictionary 689 (7th 
ed. 1999). Here Scott Tobennan and his wife voluntarily transferred title to the Home, Fann, and 
Wine to the GEF Partnerships in part performance of the BTS. Accordingly, this Court GRANTS the 
GEF Partnerships' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count II (Enforceability of Agreements). 
3. Breach of Contract: Count III 
Count III seeks a ruling that, if the Court finds that Agreements to be binding, the GEF 
() Partnerships breached the inherent duty of good faith in those Agreements. 
Cj 
Implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing are not independent causes of action apart 
from the breach of an express term. Morrell v. Wellstar Health Sys., Inc., 280 Ga. App. 1,5-6 (2006) 
(upholding a trial court's grant of summary judgment on breach of implied covenant of good faith 
where there was no independent breach of the agreement); see also, Stuart Enter. In!'!. v. Peykan, Inc., 
252 Ga. App. 231, 234 (2001). 
At oral argument, Scott Toberman's counsel contended that the GEF Partnerships improperly 
took the Partnership Interests. However, under paragraph 5(c) of the BTS, the GEF Partnerships were 
entitled to the right to receive any monies due to the Tobennan Entities as part of the pledge 
agreement. Because there is no underlying breach of the Agreements, this Court GRANTS the GEF 
Partnerships' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III (Breach of contract). 
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4. Partnership Interests: Counts V-VIII 
Scott Tobennan's complaint alleges conversion of monies due and wrongful denial of access to 
financial infonnation under certain limited partnership agreements (Counts V and VII) including St. 
Vivant, LaRose, Leoville, Chambertin and Ducru Limited Partnerships, and requests an accounting for 
payment due under such agreements (Count VI). In relation to such actions, Scott Tobennan alleges 
that the GEF Partnerships also breached fiduciary duties owed to him under the various partnership 
agreements (Count VIII). 
The Court has already concluded that the BTS is an enforceable agreement, including the 
pledge of all Tobennan assets under paragraph S(c) which included Tobennan's rights to monies and 
distributions under the partnership agreements. The pledge of assets under paragraph S(c) was 
effective upon execution of the BTS, but Tobennan has not transferred the Partnerships Interests to the 
GEF Partnerships as required under paragraph 4(e) of the BTS. Tobennan still retains at least the title 
C) to the Partnership Interests, and thus its status as a limited partner. Therefore, Tobennan may be 
entitled to access to the financial records and an accounting for the limited partnerships. On the other 
hand, Tobennan has failed to demonstrate that there is any question of fact related to the alleged 
breach of fiduciary duties owed to Tobennan under these limited partnership agreements. 
Accordingly, this Court GRANTS the GEF Partnership's Motion for Summary Judgment on Count V 
(Money Due) and Count VIII (Breach of Fiduciary Duty) and DENIES the GEF Partnerships' Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Count VI (Accounting for Partnerships) and Count VII (Breach of 
Limited Partnership Agreements). 
5. Wine: Counts IX & X 
Scott Tobennan alleges that the GEF Partnerships' taking and selling of the Wine amounted to 
conversion (Count IX) and entitles him to an accounting of the proceeds of the sale (Count X). The 
(~) BTS is enforceable, including the obligation for Scott Tobennan to transfer the Wine to the GEF 
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Partnerships. At oral argument, the GEF Partnerships' counsel indicated that an accounting ofthe sale 
o of the Wine had occurred and been distributed to Scott Tobennan. This Court GRANTS the GEF 
Partnerships' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count IX (Conversion of Wine) and Count XX 
(Accounting for Wine). However, if the accounting provided is insufficient or incomplete, Scott 
Tobennan may petition this Court for a supplemental accounting. 
6. Home & Farm: Counts XIII-XVI 
Scott Tobennan seeks the refonnation of deeds, conventional quia timet, unjust enrichment and 
constructive trusts for the Home and Fann. The BTS is a binding agreement, including the obligation 
to tender to the GEF Partnerships the deeds to the Home and Fann. In light of this ruling by the 
Court, the Court finds these Counts to be moot. This Court GRANTS the GEF Partnerships' Motion 
for Summary Judgment on Count XIII (Refonnation of Deeds), Count XIV (Conventional Quia 
Timet), Count XV (Unjust Enrichment), and Count XVI (Unjust Enrichment and Constructive 
() Trust). 
7. Money Damages: Counts XII & XVII 
Scott Tobennan seeks money damages aIleging that the GEF Partnerships improperly withheld 
monies due to him under the Partnership Interests and other assets transferred to the GEF Partnerships 
making the GEF Partnerships liable to Scott Tobennan for setoff/recoupment (Count XII) and money 
had and received (Count XVII). The BTS is a binding agreement including the pledge of all assets 
under paragraph 5(c) granting the GEF Partnerships the right to receive monies due to Tobennan. This 
Court GRANTS the GEF Partnerships' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count XII (Money had 
and received) and Count XVII (Setoff/recoupment). 
8. Attorneys' Fees & Punitive Damages: Counts XIX & XX 
The Court in this Order is granting summary judgment to the GEF Partnerships on several, but 
o not all, Counts of the Complaint. Thus, a ruling on attorneys' fees and punitive damages is not 
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appropriate at this time. This Court DENIES the GEF Partnerships' Motion for Summary Judgment 
() on Count XIX (Attomeys' Fees) and Count XX (Punitive Damages). 
V. SUMMARY 
This Court hereby GRANTS the GEF Partnerships' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on 
Count XV of the First Amended Counterclaim by declaring the BTS to be an enforceable, binding 
agreement and finds that Tobennan's failure to pay the Settlement Amount and failure to transfer the 
Partnership Interests to be breaches of the BTS. This Court hereby DENIES Tobennan's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings as to Count XV ofthe First Amended Counterclaim. 
In light of the binding nature of the BTS, this Court hereby GRANTS the GEF Partnerships' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Count I (Fraudulent Inducement), Count II (Enforceability of 
Agreements), Count III (Breach of Contract- Inherent Duty of Good Faith), Count V (Money Due), 
Count VIII (Breach of Fiduciary Duty), Count IX (Conversion of Wine), Count X (Accounting for 
C) Wine), Count XI (Civil Conspiracy), XII (Money Had and Received), Count XIII (Refonnation of 
Deeds), Count XIV (Conventional Quia Timet), Count XV (Unjust Enrichment), Count XVI (Unjust 
(J 
Enrichment and Constructive Trust), and Count XVII (Setoff/Recoupment) and DENIES the GEF 
Partnerships' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count VI (Breach of Limited Partnership 
Agreements), Count VII (Accounting for Partnership Interests), Count XIX (Attorneys' Fees), and 
Count XX (Punitive Damages) of Scott Tobennan's Amended and Restated Complaint. 
. -t4 
SO ORDERED this 02..tJ day of May, 2007. 
ETH E. LONG, SENIO JUDGE 
Supe ·or Court of Fulton County 
Atlarr a Judicial Circuit 
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Copies to: 
Timothy Kratz, Esq. 
McGuire Woods LLP 
1117 Peachtree St., Suite 2100 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309 
(404) 443-5730 
Debra A. Wilson, Esq. 
Schreeder, Wheeler & Flint, LLP 
1100 Peachtree Street, N.E., Suite 800 
Atlanta, Georgia 30309 
(404) 954-9833 
Gary Marsh, Esq. 
McKenna Long & Aldridge, LLP 
303 Peachtree Street, NE" Suite 5300 
Atlanta, GA 30308 
(404) 527-4150 
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Anthony Cochran, Esq. 
Chili vis, Cochran, Larking 
& Bever, LLP 
3127 Maple Dr. N.E. 
Atlanta, Georgia 303054 
(404) 233-4171 
Paul E. Slater, Esq. 
Sperling & Slater, P .C. 
55 West Momoe Street, Suite 3200 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
(312) 368-5937 
